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The use of medical metaphors in politics is a well-honed rhetorical strategy.  We talk of ‘diagnos-
ing’ political and social ills; of governments having to ‘prescribe tough medicine’; and of politicians 
‘sugar coating’ policies the public doesn’t want to swallow.  Sometimes these metaphors help clarify 
the political world.  Other times the rhetorical comparison hides more truth than it reveals.
We ask whether the idea of a ‘political placebo’ — or more precisely, a political placebo effect — can 
be usefully applied to the social sciences.  Up to this point, the idea of a ‘political placebo’ has been 
used only haphazardly (and with little conceptual clarity) to describe cynical political efforts to sell 
snake oil to the masses.  In contrast, we argue that a more refined conceptualization of a political 
placebo effect — one which understands the placebo effect as a phenomenon in which certain ac-
tions and words by  medical or scientific authorities lead to an observable effect other than those 
that would have been predicted on the basis of the dominant predictive scientific and medical 
models — would be a useful tool for social scientific reflection.  When applied to the political realm, 
such a concept (with its attentiveness to the multi-faceted effects of structures of meaning, emo-
tions and the complex interaction between mind and body) helps us understand a wide variety of 
situations in which primarily mental stimuli — e.g.  language, concepts, policy ideas — have impor-
tant and observable effects other than those that would be predicted by the dominant predictive 
rational-actor theories.  
This article develops this conceptualization of the political placebo effect by (a) synthesizing three 
of the main findings of contemporary scientific explanations of medical placebos; (b) identify-
ing how these characteristics should also define the concept of a political placebo effect; and (c) 
demonstrating with reference to two examples how such a concept can help us understand specific 
political events and situations more convincingly than would otherwise be the case.  
Introduction
The use of medical metaphors in politics is a well-
honed rhetorical strategy.  We talk of ‘diagnosing’ 
political and social problems; of public policy pre-
scribing a ‘plan of treatment’ to solve social ills; 
of governments having to ‘give the public some 
tough medicine’; of politicians ‘sugar coating’ 
the pills that the public doesn’t want to swallow. 
Sometimes these metaphors help to clarify the 
political world.  Other times, however, the rhe-
torical comparison masks more than it reveals.
This article asks whether the idea of a ‘politi-
cal placebo’ — or more precisely, a ‘political pla-
cebo effect’ — is a useful concept to introduce to 
the social sciences.  Up to this point, the idea of a 
‘political placebo’ has been used only haphazard-
ly — mostly in journalistic writing and with little 
conceptual clarity.  In these circles, it has been 
used as little more than a shorthand description 
for political rhetoric or empty promises which, in 
offering the policy equivalent of useless sugar pills, 
are nothing more than placeholders for procrasti-
nation or manipulative attempts to sell snake oil 
to the masses.  
This common usage, however, misunder-
stands the very idea of a placebo effect as it has 
been used in the medical and scientific context 
and thus misrepresents the ways in which the con-
cept of a political placebo effect might be relevant 
to our understanding of the political landscape. 
To be clear, the medical and scientific descriptions 
of a placebo effect are clearly not a description of 
a state in which a doctor lies to a patient and pre-
scribes her/him a ‘solution’ that has no effect what-
soever, other than to preserve a doctor’s authority 
or interests.  Rather, the most persuasive theories 
about placebo effects understand it as a situation 
in which certain actions and words undertaken 
by medical or scientific authorities lead to an ob-
servable effect in the patient, but one that is differ-
ent from the effects (or lack of effects) that would 
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have been predicted on the basis of the dominant 
scientific and medical models.  As Harrington 
(2006:  181) describes it, there are at least three 
definitions of the placebo effect in circulation:
a) a short term and illusory impression of 
improved health that some patients expe-
rience when they take an inert substance 
that looks like real medicine (e.g., a sugar 
pill);
b) the non-specific effects of medical 
treatment that, in clinical trials, must be 
controlled in order for researchers to as-
sess the specific effects of new interven-
tions, especially drugs;
c) a powerful mind–body phenomenon 
with a specific “real” biology all its own, 
one that medicine should study and 
exploit.
Despite common assumptions that the third 
definition is the most enlightened of the three, 
Harrington explains that the first two remain 
influential and have yet to be displaced by the 
third.  While each of these definitions “is thor-
oughly incompatible with the others”, each “nev-
ertheless enjoys some authority in society today” 
(Harrington, 2006: 182).  
Rather than reproduce the disagreements in 
the scholarly community about how to define the 
placebo effect in medicine, this article focuses 
on outlining the main relevant characteristics of 
what we believe is the strongest definition in or-
der to develop a concept of a political placebo ef-
fect.  We argue that it is profoundly inaccurate to 
use the concept of a political placebo effect to de-
scribe those banal and frequent situations where 
politicians intentionally mislead the public or try 
to avoid solving problems by offering solutions or 
claims that they clearly know will have no impact 
on the political problem that has been ‘diagnosed’ 
or on the issue that has been identified as requir-
ing urgent action.  Instead, we suggest that po-
litical placebo effects should refer to situations in 
which primarily mental stimuli — e.g., language, 
concepts, and policy ideas — have important and 
observable effects other than those captured by 
the dominant, predictive rational-actor theories, 
but which might be understandable on the basis 
of theories that explore the multi-faceted effects of 
structures of meaning, emotions and the complex 
interaction between mind and body.  Moreover, 
we want to argue that such a reconceptualization 
could help us to reflect more thoughtfully about 
many types of political events and situations.  
Fully exploring these contentions is beyond 
the scope of a single article and we have had to 
forego many interesting questions and avenues of 
exploration in the interests of space.  As such, the 
modest goal of this article is, first, to sketch the 
main parameters of a redefined concept of the po-
litical placebo effect and then second, to illustrate 
how this might help us interpret contemporary 
politics by using the concept of a political placebo 
effect to analyse, albeit briefly, two recent political 
events.  To do so, we begin by outlining the tradi-
tional medical understandings of the placebo ef-
fect to set the context correctly.  In section 2, we 
outline three characteristics of new medical defi-
nitions of the placebo effect and suggest the ways 
in which these inform our concept of a political 
placebo effect.  In section 3 we offer brief and 
necessarily partial analyses of two political events 
using this concept and show how this provides a 
different interpretation than many dominant po-
litical science perspectives and finally close with a 
short conclusion.  
Traditional perspectives on 
the placebo effect
For many citizens of modern, industrialized soci-
eties, medicine is the archetypical and most con-
cretely experienced example of the practical role 
that science plays in our everyday life.  Viewed as a 
site where legitimate scientific knowledge is used 
to objectively diagnose illness and prescribe reli-
able and effective solutions, it is generally viewed 
as a profoundly evidence-based practice in which 
the direct causal effects of various treatments are 
well established and clear.  And yet, there are 
many phenomena that science can observe, but 
cannot precisely explain.  Common reactions to 
such cases (by researchers, doctors and the public 
at large) range from grandfatherly dismissals of 
the phenomenon as irrelevant (i.e. if the occur-
rences seem ‘random’ or direct, specific causes 
can not be identified as mandated by the scientific 
method, it is assumed to be non-existent and/or 
inexplicable and thus unworthy of study) to the 
outright rejection of them as being the figments 
of people’s imaginations.  This latter reaction, and 
the serious consequences that result, can be seen 
in the medical community’s historic and ongoing 
tendency to disregard and belittle a variety of al-
ternative therapies and traditional medicines of 
various shapes; to dismiss women’s’ health con-
cerns as merely ‘in one’s head’ (Dumit, 2006); 
and to refuse to recognize a range of what have 
come to be known as “contested illnesses”, such as 
Multiple Chemical Sensitivity, Fibromyalgia, and 
Chronic Fatigue Syndrome (Brown et al., 2004).
This context is particularly relevant when 
considering the genealogy of the traditional 
medical definition of the placebo effect.  At its 
most basic, the term ‘placebo’ is used to describe 
an intervention of some type — whether it be a 
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sugar pill, a saline injection, or a physical proce-
dure — that is believed to be ‘inert’ and have no 
direct, specific, causal impact on the condition of 
interest.  What makes the placebo such an inter-
esting phenomenon, however, is not simply that 
it is a widely used tool to create control groups in 
medical research.  Rather, it is the observed exis-
tence of a so-called ‘placebo effect’.  
A conventional definition of the placebo ef-
fect describes the fact that under certain condi-
tions, the administration of supposedly inert and 
non-causal treatments are accompanied by mea-
surable changes in the patient in ways that cannot 
be explained by current scientific knowledge.  The 
placebo effect is a highly variable phenomenon 
that is quite dependent on the context in which 
it is observed and administered, its existence and 
strength varies considerably between cultures, in-
dividuals and time and it is not easily predicted 
since, despite significant effort, researchers have 
not identified reliable ‘placebo responder’ char-
acteristics.  Given the broader context described 
above, it is perhaps not surprising that the medi-
cal community has traditionally responded to 
this effect quite ambivalently.  On the one hand, 
the behaviour of medical practitioners seems to 
suggest that many believe that the placebo effect 
is an important reality, since studies suggest that 
many doctors prescribe vitamins, pills or antibi-
otics even in cases where no evidence exists that 
they will have a physical or chemical impact be-
cause they believe that there are real and positive 
health benefits to this practice even if they can’t 
explain why*.  On the other hand, however, the 
placebo effect has been largely dismissed as a 
legitimate type of therapy in itself†.  In fact, the 
very term ‘placebo’ itself (the Latin term means 
‘to please’) highlights its contested validity by sug-
gesting that placebos are merely given to ‘please’ 
the patient and are not worthy of serious scientific 
investigation.
If this were all there was to the current state 
of thinking on placebos and the placebo effect, 
it would be of little interest to those of us who 
study the political world.  At worst, it would be 
a catch-all phrase to group a series of political 
phenomena that are inexplicable through a set 
of universal natural laws of human behaviour 
and interaction.  Even at best, it would merely 
describe the nature of knowledge in the social 
sciences.  As many theories in the social sci-
ences have shown, certain aspects of the social 
world (i.e. the fact that it is made up of interac-
tions between at least semi-conscious beings who 
demonstrate vastly different responses to similar 
stimuli across individuals, cultures and temporal 
periods) make it profoundly resistant to many of 
the dominant epistemological strands in the hard 
sciences (e.g.,  assumptions about the existence 
of enduring laws of nature; the use of certainty, 
repeatability and predictability as markers of reli-
able evidence). 
Over the last decade or so, however, an in-
creasing number of fields of medical and scien-
tific inquiry have begun to offer complex and 
thoughtful perspectives on phenomenon such 
as the placebo effect.  Exploring these develop-
ments, and their relevance for a concept of a po-
litical placebo effect, is therefore the focus of the 
next section.
New perspectives on placebos 
and the implications for  
politics
Given space constraints, we have chosen to focus 
on three broad themes in the scientific literature 
that are most relevant for our attempt to develop 
a useful and valid concept of the placebo for po-
litical contexts. 
Mind-Body Interplay 
It is increasingly clear that ‘placebo effects’ are not 
mysterious, random and inexplicable.  They are 
examples of the increasingly well-demonstrated 
(but only incompletely understood) complex inter-
play between the mind and the body (Harrington, 
2008).  As is well known, many of the dominant 
scientific and medical paradigms of the 20th cen-
tury followed a relatively rigid and reductionist 
Cartesian perspective, one that both assumed 
a fundamental division between the body and 
mind and privileged the identification of physi-
cal/chemical factors as the sole model of legiti-
mate scientific explanation.  Recent scientific re-
search, however, has increasingly demonstrated 
that the mind and body are not hermetically 
sealed and discrete units that can be analyzed 
in isolation from one another.  Instead, various 
fields of scientific and medical inquiry are now 
(re)discovering that mental practices and states 
can have significant, if often difficult to antici-
pate and understand, physiological effects (and 
vice-versa).  
New studies, for example, are showing that a 
variety of traditional and non-conventional prac-
tices have very specific and measurable effects on 
the body.  In particular, studies suggest that men-
tal practices have direct impact on physical states. 
For example, practices such as yoga and medita-
tion are shown to have significant and measur-
able impacts on stress levels, hormone flows in 
the body and a variety of other physiological 
indicators (Merrell, 2008, especially chapter 1). 
Other studies suggest that perceptions of ‘choice’ 
can also affect physical health outcomes (Polsky 
 
* See, for example, the many 
studies cited and discussed 
in Raz et al. 2008. Some 
particularly relevant studies 
are Sherman and Hickner 
2008; Nitzan and Lichten-
berg 2004; Hrobjartsson and 
Norup 2003; Raz et al 2009; 
Tilburt et al. 2008. 
 
† See, for example, the 
responses to Foddy’s 2009 
article in the same issue of 
the American Journal of 
Bioethics.
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et al., 2002).  Still others have shown a variety of 
other effects mental practices can have on physi-
cal states (Moerman, 2002; Raz et al., 2008; Wilce, 
2003; Kihlstrom, 2008).  
Now, it is surely not the case that practices of 
yoga, meditation or choice have suddenly begun 
having scientifically observable effects.  Rather, 
we are only now starting to understand their 
physiological effects from a scientific perspective 
both because new technologies have made avail-
able new types of evidence and because some re-
searchers have been bold enough to develop new 
theories that challenge the reductionist model. 
One of the important lessons from this recent turn 
is that we often forget the degree to which the as-
sumptions and practices of dominant knowledge 
paradigms and methodologies profoundly shape 
our (sometimes mis-) understanding of various 
phenomena.  These new findings, for instance, 
were occasioned by the willingness of researchers 
to develop new and ‘fuzzier’ concepts of causa-
tion, expand the definition of what counts as ‘evi-
dence’ and explore the ramifications of these new 
types of evidence as they became available.  
Both of these lessons are important for new 
understandings of the placebo effect.  They sug-
gest that the placebo effect is not a description of 
something that is literally inexplicable.  Rather, 
it describes something that has an effect other 
than what might be predicted by ‘dualist’ scien-
tific knowledge paradigms.  It can be reliably un-
derstood in light of new paradigms that see our 
mind–body as a complex and inextricably linked 
set of reactions that respond to both ‘physical’ and 
‘mental’ stimuli.
What are the implications of this shift in a 
scientific understanding of the placebo effect for 
those of us who study politics? We believe that 
social scientists who are interested in the concept 
of a political placebo effect need also to highlight 
the ways in which new perspectives on the mind–
body relationship can enrich our own study of the 
political world.  It is not particularly controver-
sial to say that for much of the 20th century, many 
disciplines in the social sciences, and certainly 
that of political science, were heavily influenced 
by a Cartesian-like dualist set of assumptions that 
largely, if heuristically, separated mind from body 
and set up what some have called an ‘intellectu-
alist’ or rationalist foundation (see Westen, 2007; 
Lakoff, 2008).  In political science, as with other 
disciplines, ‘rational actor’ theories and models 
have been the most obvious and rigid manifes-
tation of this basic epistemological predisposi-
tion, but many other perspectives and theories 
also share these assumptions even if they differ in 
other ways.
This rationalist and intellectualist base, 
though dominant, has never been entirely uncon-
tested, of course.  Scholars from a number of dis-
ciplines, including economics, political science 
and psychology, have challenged the assumptions 
about formal rationality that many economic-
inspired models of decision making embody 
are sufficient to understand the behaviour of 
the market, the state, or the individual.  Perhaps 
most famously, Herbert Simon (1957) introduced 
the notion of “bounded rationality” to account 
for those instances in which decision-making is 
limited by particular contexts, where individu-
als must settle on less-than-ideal preferences. 
In the field of political psychology, Tversky and 
Kahneman have expanded on these ideas, argu-
ing that individuals employ three heuristics when 
making judgements in conditions of uncertainty, 
even if these “shortcuts”  “may lead to systematic 
and potentially severe errors” (Levy, 2002: 271). 
They are: “(i) representativeness, which is usually 
employed when people are asked to judge the 
probability that an object or event A belongs to 
class or process B; (ii) availability of instances or 
scenarios, which is often employed when people 
are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the 
plausibility of a particular development; and (iii) 
adjustments from an anchor, which is usually em-
ployed in numerical prediction when a relevant 
value is available” (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974: 
1131, emphases added).
Others have generalized these concerns and 
over the last 15 years, critiques of the relevance of 
economic models for understanding the political 
world have gained in strength.  In the mid-1990s, 
Green and Shapiro’s Pathologies of Rational Choice 
Theory (1994) critiqued the ubiquity of rational 
choice approaches in political science, while also 
noting that many of these political theories had 
neglected to incorporate some of the important 
internal critiques levelled by economists and psy-
chologists themselves.  Renwick Monroe and Hill 
Maher (1995: 6) summarize the crux of the prob-
lem with applying economic ideas to the political 
realm: “the general assumptions underlying the 
economic approach to human behaviour — the 
belief that human behaviour can best be under-
stood by assuming that people pursue individual 
self interest subject to information and oppor-
tunity costs — do not apply consistently enough 
once we enter the realm of the political.  This 
means the market metaphor produces only lim-
ited explanations of political behaviour. .  . it en-
counters serious limitations whenever the tech-
nical foundation for the market does not exist in 
politics.  Much political behaviour falls into this 
category, precisely because most political acts are 
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analogous to public goods, and all the conven-
tional economic theories break down in the pres-
ence of public goods.”
Others have shown that in the day-to-day 
rough and tumble of politics, large blocs of voters 
frequently support parties whose policies clearly 
work against those same voters’ interests and that 
political rhetoric has effects that are not easy to 
predict using rationalist models (e.g., Fischer, 
2009; Marcus, Neuman & Mackuen, 2000; Yanow, 
2000).  Recent work in the field of sociology, psy-
chology and politics also has taken seriously the 
role that emotions play in structuring the ter-
rain of collective action, and in moving beyond 
approaches that privilege structures of political 
opportunity or other “rational” features of the po-
litical environment (Flam and King, 2005; Gould, 
2009; Jasper, 1998; Lakoff, 2008, Westen, 2007).
Yet despite all these critiques, many influen-
tial theoretical traditions in political science have 
not fully incorporated these critiques and moved 
beyond these limitations.  As Levy notes (2002: 
271), rational economic models emerged as domi-
nant paradigms in political science just as they 
came under close scrutiny from experimental 
economists.  And they remain powerful currents 
even though that model is critiqued within and 
beyond the discipline.  Recognizing the contin-
ued influence of rational actor perspectives is thus 
not to perpetuate an outdated bogeyman or ‘straw 
man’ *.  Rather, it is to underscore that despite a 
variety of critical interventions, rational actor 
perspectives remain influential in political sci-
ence and continue to define common interpreta-
tions and analyses of political events in ways that 
have limited how political science has understood 
and developed the concept of a placebo effect.
If we return to the question of a political pla-
cebo effect, we can see that its traditional defini-
tion reflects an assumption that political actors 
can be understood primarily as rational and 
narrowly self-interested agents.  In the common 
journalistic usage, a political placebo is used 
consciously and cynically by one rational agent 
(the self-interested politician) to hoodwink an-
other rational, but imperfectly informed, agent 
(the voting public).  What is important to note is 
that in this usage, there is little recognition that 
the placebo itself has any effect other than ‘fool-
ing’ the electorate into forgetting about the issue 
and believing that it has been addressed.  A po-
litical placebo, in this view, is indistinguishable 
from snake oil.  Both are fakes that may trick the 
unwary consumer into parting with their hard-
earned dollar or vote.  Neither is viewed as having 
any real effect beyond that.
In contrast, we believe that political scientists 
should employ both the existing critiques of the 
rational actor model in the social sciences and the 
recent perspectives developed in neuroscientific 
and medical fields to redefine the concept of the 
political placebo effect.  Moreover, we believe that 
it is useful to draw on the work of scholars who 
have challenged the sufficiency of rational actor 
models, highlighting systematic patterns of ‘non-
rational’ zones or tendencies in human decision 
making.  For instance, Connolly, Doidge, Lakoff, 
Rose and Westen have argued that we need to 
create a perspective that fully incorporates the 
fact that human decision making is, at its very 
core, an interaction of the mind–body complex 
combining emotional and ‘rational’ calculation 
that cannot be heuristically separated (Connolly, 
2002; Doidge, 2007; Lakoff, 2008; Rose, 2007; 
Westen, 2007).
What is novel about the perspective these 
authors bring (as compared to earlier critiques of 
rational actor assumptions) is not only that they 
suggest that political scientists expand their own 
theoretical toolkit to allow for the possibility that 
physiological phenomena can profoundly affect 
a wide variety of politically relevant thoughts 
(e.g., which ideas/concepts/language/values seem 
most persuasive) and actions (e.g., who we vote 
for, what we protest against).  It is that these au-
thors suggest that this is true in reverse, as well: 
certain habitual thoughts or mental practices can 
stimulate and reshape physiological reactions, re-
shaping our preferences or actions in the process. 
Moreover, they argue that we need to establish 
new, creative sources and standards of evidence 
that reflect the complex nature of the mind–body 
interaction rather than simply reflect disciplinari-
ly constructed (but ultimately contestable) norms 
of the dominant epistemological and method-
ological trends.
We therefore contend that the first step in a 
properly constituted conception of the political 
placebo effect is to challenge the limits of analy-
sis prescribed by strict rational actor theories and 
instead embrace theoretical models that appreci-
ate the complex interplay of mind and body.  If 
we do not, the political placebo effect will appear 
as little more than the selling of snake oil, fakery, 
or a strategy to hoodwink the masses.  We don’t 
need more concepts or names for these types of 
practices, however.  We should, instead, call them 
what they are: crude and conscious attempts to 
manipulate the voting public.  In contrast, once 
we adopt a perspective that understands the 
mind–body interplay, we can conceptualize the 
political placebo effect as a situation where pri-
marily mental stimuli (e.g., language, concepts, 
policy ideas) appear to have important effects 
other than those that would be predicted by nar-
row rational-actor theories.  
 
* Our thanks to one of the 
Journal’s reviewers for chal-
lenging us on this point.
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This, however, leads us to an important ques-
tion.  If a political placebo effect describes a situa-
tion that cannot be explained fully and/or clearly 
according to dominant dualist theories, and we 
don’t believe it can be dismissed as inexplicable 
and irrational, how do we ‘explain’ and under-
stand the ways in which political placebo effects 
function? How, in other words, does it work? 
Here, a second characteristic of the most per-
suasive theories of the medical placebo effect is 
instructive.
The Meaning Effect
Returning to the medical context, a more nu-
anced understanding of the mind–body complex 
has lead researchers to argue that scientists who 
want to understand the medical placebo effect, 
need to better understand the mental context in 
which these phenomena are embedded.  In this 
sense, a second characteristic of some of the most 
persuasive theories of the medical placebo effect 
in the scientific literature is the assertion that un-
derstanding the structure of meaning and expecta-
tions and ‘knowledge/authority’ roles is crucial for 
understanding how, if and when the placebo effect 
functions.
In this vein, we follow Dan Moerman’s con-
cept of the ‘meaning response’ as an exemplary 
way to rethink the placebo effect (Moerman, 
2002).  Moerman suggests that we understand the 
placebo effect as being caused by the structure of 
meaning and expectations in which the admin-
istration of a placebo takes place.  Importantly, 
his work implies that the structure of meaning 
and expectation does not necessarily even op-
erate at the level of conscious or explicit aware-
ness.  An implicit and unquestioned faith in the 
good will, authority and competence of a doctor, 
for example, is often crucial to the “success” of a 
placebo effect.  By highlighting the fact that it is 
the normal case, and not the exception, in which 
‘meaning’ (e.g., conscious and unconscious psy-
chological states of mind and thoughts) and phys-
ical responses are closely interlinked and co-con-
stitutive, he allows us to understand the placebo 
effect not as something mysterious and random, 
but rather as something as predictable (or not) as 
other social phenomenon whose emergence and 
effects are general but not universal, patterned 
but not uniform.  Moreover, by explaining how 
the ‘reward circuitry’ of the brain can help explain 
how expectations can have physiological effects, 
Enck et al. further help to demonstrate that many 
recent studies in neuroscience support Moerman’s 
theory (Enck et al., 2008).
One of the implications of Moerman’s theory 
is that researchers who are interested in under-
standing how the placebo effect functions will 
likely need to supplement their own theoretical 
and methodological frameworks (with their fo-
cus on direct, specific, physical and chemical cau-
sation) with approaches that examine how con-
scious and unconscious structures of meaning 
profoundly influence the behaviour of both indi-
viduals and groups of individuals.  As research-
ers in the social sciences, this seems to open a 
particularly promising bridge between scientific 
and our own disciplines since the central focus of 
many scholars in the social sciences and humani-
ties is to understand these types of questions.  
In fact, many prominent theorists in the ‘hu-
man sciences’ would be unsurprised that the so-
called placebo effect is intimately connected to, 
and shaped by, meaning responses.  Ian Hacking, 
the influential philosopher of science, has long 
argued that certain, socially recognized, roles 
and the types of meaning they produce, can have 
particularly important effects on our behaviour. 
Scientifically and medically authorized classifica-
tions, labels and discourses can affect the most 
profound levels of our self-conceptualization and 
behaviour — as well as the ways in which others 
respond to us (Hacking, 2000: 104).  He calls 
subjects who are particularly caught up in these 
behaviour-affecting classifications ‘interactive 
kinds’ and suggests that they are ‘inter’ actors and 
not just ‘actors’ because of the complex interplay 
between the subject and the meanings that en-
gender that subject.  The ‘inter’ reminds us of “the 
way in which the classification and the individual 
classified may interact, the way in which the ac-
tors may become self-aware as being of a kind, if 
only because of being treated or institutionalized 
as of that kind, and so experiences themselves in 
that way” (Hacking, 2000: 104).  This is what sep-
arates interactive behaviour (of which much hu-
man behaviour is) from that of other phenomena 
studied by scientists.  Interactive kinds differ from 
indifferent kinds such as quarks because “calling a 
quark a quark makes no difference to the quark” 
(Hacking, 2000: 105), whereas dominant repre-
sentations and discourse clearly help construct 
and limit public policy generally (Yanow, 2000) 
and specifically.  For instance, stereotyped rep-
resentations of certain visible minorities as lazy 
has been shown to have demonstrable impacts 
on perceptions of public support for state social 
safety nets (Ingram and Schneider, 2005: 8).  
The impact of the embedded narratives and 
emotional factors can be great even in the most 
scientific of public policy issues — something that 
has been made by the controversies over the link 
between vaccines and autism.  Despite the fact 
that the initial British study linking vaccines and 
autism has been widely refuted and retracted, 
many parents continue to question the safety of 
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vaccines (Hobson-West, 2003; Casiday, 2007; 
Orsini and Smith, 2010).  As Hobson-West has 
noted (2003), the failure of public health authori-
ties to manage vaccination fears stems from an 
inability to see beyond a rationalist, ‘information 
deficit’ model that assumes that parents simply re-
quire reliable information (evidence) on which to 
base their decisions.  In contrast, the vaccination 
case demonstrates that the meaning structure and 
emotional dimensions of scientific policy issues 
can be crucial dimensions that affect behaviour.
In the context of research on the placebo ef-
fect, this perspective suggests that we need to 
examine more carefully the parameters of the 
meaning of roles, expectations and discourses 
that are the meaning context in which the pla-
cebo effect occurs.  Perhaps most importantly, 
the set of roles and expectations is characterized 
by a significant and explicitly accepted imbalance 
of power, knowledge and authority.  The person 
who administers the placebo is almost always a 
figure (whether a doctor or researcher) who is as-
sumed to possess an expertise that is unimpeach-
able.  Reinforced by a variety of symbolic contexts 
outside of the personal interaction itself (rang-
ing from the use of medical jargon, symbols and 
narratives which establish competence, special-
ization, and authority to the social expectations 
read into the architecture of a clinical space), the 
patient generally invests a significant amount of 
trust in the placebo provider and thus expects 
that the ‘treatment’ will work.  In this sense, it is 
not surprising that the areas where the placebo 
effect have been most consistently observed are 
those that are closely linked to ‘emotional’ medi-
cal issues and situations in which self-perception 
is central (e.g., judgments about relative pain 
levels, degrees of happiness, etc.).  Since these 
are often areas that are most closely linked to 
conscious conceptualization, it is reasonable that 
they would be most directly influenced by mean-
ing structures.  What impact any one element 
of the meaning context might have in any given 
situation — and how each is created — is an open 
question in placebo research, since few investi-
gators have pursued aggressively the question of 
the meaning effect in this way.  But it seems clear 
that this should be an important avenue for future 
research.
What are the implications of this for our no-
tion of a political placebo effect? Perhaps the most 
important point is that it highlights the need to 
understand the broad structures of meanings 
and roles — many of them implicit and taken-for-
granted in our everyday experience — that form 
the crucial context for placebo-like political phe-
nomena.  Moreover, it suggests that it is unlikely 
that any single theory will provide a comprehen-
sive answer to how every political placebo effect 
might function.  While we might observe broad 
patterns and similarities, investigating political 
placebo effects will require a delicate combina-
tion of broad theoretical inspiration with care-
ful empirical research of the specific events and 
their context.  This suggests that researchers re-
main open to the diversity of social science and 
humanities theories and methodologies that seek 
to interpret and understand social structures of 
meaning and their impact on human behaviour.  
Given that many of the most pressing politi-
cal issues are profoundly emotional, it also seems 
likely that a concept of the political placebo effect 
will be a valuable way of examining consistent 
patterns of political discourse and policy forma-
tion that, from a rationalist-tinged perspective, 
seem to be inexplicable and ‘irrational’.  The con-
cept of a political placebo is likely to be especially 
relevant to politics given the fact that scientists 
have observed not only placebo effects but also 
nocebo effects — situations in which patients 
demonstrate increased pain and negative pain 
outcomes in response to certain chemically inert, 
but mentally stimulating, interventions.  Many of 
the most puzzling political phenomena of con-
temporary politics concern the ways in which 
seemingly ‘excessive’ negative emotions and atti-
tudes are so easily, but inexplicably, intensified by 
political rhetoric.
Political parties wishing to elicit the support 
of voters feel compelled to tap into emotional 
landscapes of fear and anger, fear of the other as 
expressed in undocumented immigrants, anger 
over the ballooning costs of the welfare state and 
its “greedy” beneficiaries.  Tapping into this well-
spring of emotions can lead to demonstrable po-
litical gains even if the larger cause is not affected, 
even if the anger leads nowhere, is directionless, 
without purpose.  In this sense, the concept of 
a political placebo effect might help us to better 
classify and understand these forms of emotional 
politics that can be corrosive for democracy.
The Question of Ethics
Central to most medical discussions of placebos 
are questions about the ethical stakes of place-
bos.  Given the normative stakes of the study of 
politics, it is almost certain that a concept of a po-
litical placebo effect will inspire many questions 
about the ethics of political placebos, as well.  If, 
as we have argued here, political science can learn 
much from the scientific and medical literature 
on placebos, we believe that a concept of political 
placebo effects will likely inspire a series of very 
different ethical questions and analyses.  Perhaps 
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the best way to demonstrate this is to highlight 
some of the crucial differences in contexts be-
tween the two and then tease out some of their 
implications.
There is a strain of ethical argumentation in 
the medical literature that argues that placebo 
treatment plans are ethically defensible (Foddy, 
2009).  Taking this line of argumentation, the 
political analogy would be to suggest that using 
political placebo effects is also legitimate.  It be-
comes apparent, however, that the types of as-
sumptions that one can make about the clinical 
context are not easily transferable to the political 
realm.  First, Foddy’s argument is premised on the 
assumption that placebo practitioners are experts 
who can correctly diagnose and prescribe the best 
treatment and thus use placebos only once they 
have exhausted other options.  This is not the case 
in the political realm.  For example, the various 
selection filters and stages that characterize the 
path to political power do not necessarily select 
for and reward either expertise or competence. 
Rather, elected officials arrive with a wide range 
of relevant expertise and know-how that is appro-
priate to the job.  Unlike scientists, they can not 
claim the status of expert.
Second, Foddy’s argument assumes that pla-
cebo practitioners will make decisions to use 
placebos only when they view it to be in the best 
interests of their patients.  This is what makes 
most of us willing to trust doctors and accept a 
significant power imbalance of authority.  This 
too differs significantly when applied to the po-
litical context.  On the one hand, the relation-
ship between public officials and citizen/voters is 
characterized by power asymmetries, or imbal-
ances of power/knowledge.  While it may appear 
to be more pronounced in the case of the former, 
given the knowledge that physicians might have 
vis-à-vis their patients, not to mention their abil-
ity to shield themselves from patient scrutiny, in 
the world of politics, much of the “stuff ” of deci-
sion-making is also shrouded in mystery.  And in 
theory, elected officials have a duty to “serve” their 
constituents — which is why we seemingly trust 
our elected officials in the first place.  In practice, 
however, citizens are increasingly realizing that 
the theory of our elected officials faithfully ‘serv-
ing’ their constituencies is detached from reality. 
Elected officials do not take a Hippocratic Oath 
when they enter office, nor is there a self-regu-
lating and disciplinary body like the Canadian 
Medical Association to monitor political officials 
on any but the most egregious examples of ethical 
breaches of duty.  While doctors sometimes act in 
their self-interest and disregard the patient’s in-
terests, these cases are largely the exception and 
there are multiple levels and incentives within the 
medical system that are designed to guard against 
this.  The political world stands in sharp contrast 
to its medical counterpart.  In politics, the self-
regulating institution is the political party, whose 
primary interest is to secure and maintain power, 
not protect the interests of the citizenry at large.  
Another importance difference between the 
medical and the political realm concerns the 
main unit of analysis.  Foddy’s argument is pre-
mised on the idea that a medical encounter can 
be reduced to the interaction between physician 
and patient (even if that encounter is mediated 
by the social context in which it takes place). 
Politics, in contrast, is almost never centred on 
the interests of a single individual.  Rather, it is by 
nature focused on the ability of elected officials to 
aggregate a series of complex and diverging in-
terests.  Moreover, the success of elected officials 
usually depends precisely on how well they can 
reconcile these divergent demands, a task that 
usually means failing to address any single con-
stituent’s specific interests.
This context means that another assumption 
at the core of the ethical argument in favour of 
placebos is also problematic in a political con-
text.  The argument in favour of placebos assumes 
that placebos are always safe.  At worst, they are 
merely inert.  At best, they are positive.  But in 
the political world, they are not always safe.  Since 
politics is about multiple interests and individu-
als, what might be a placebo for one person or 
group is a nocebo for another.  
Finally, the argument in favour of placebos 
relies heavily on the idea that placebo-enabling 
deception does not vitiate the fundamental val-
ues of autonomy and truth so strongly that this 
would outweigh the positive clinical effects. 
This too is difficult to transfer into the political 
realm.  Even if we agree with Foddy that there is 
no absolute duty to tell the truth and agree that 
one might be willing to accept being deceived if 
assured by an authority that she/he is acting in 
your best interests, these conditions are difficult 
to establish in the political realm.  Even more 
importantly, however, the difference between a 
clinical context and a democratic political con-
text is that self-governance is the first principle of 
democracy.  As such, if deception is to be accept-
ed as ‘ethical’ in the political realm, it can only 
be in the very most extreme of circumstances. 
In a democracy, access to the truth, and thus the 
ability to make autonomous decisions with refer-
ence to that information, is not a ‘nice to have’ 
characteristic; it is absolutely essential.  This is 
not to say, however, that the opposite conclusion 
should be accepted — that it is clear and obvious 
that political placebos should never be viewed 
as ethical.  Rather, we believe the foregoing has 
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demonstrated that the context (e.g., the questions 
posed and the stakes involved) governing the 
scientific administration of placebos differs radi-
cally from how we think about the notion of the 
placebo in the political context.  At worst, this is 
an area where political thought will not be able to 
learn from the academic treatment of placebos in 
the scientific literature.  At best, there is a need to 
specify some of the common theoretical assump-
tions underpinning our understanding of the 
placebo effect — in both the political and clinical 
environments.
The Political Placebo Effect 
in Practice
As previously mentioned, space does not permit 
a detailed exploration of the many ways in which 
this concept might help us to understand politi-
cal phenomena.  But we think it is important to 
briefly illustrate its concrete relevance by using it 
to analyze two recent political events.  
Populist Protest Politics
The emergence of the Tea Party movement — and 
its very concrete impact on electoral politics in the 
U.S. — has vividly demonstrated that neo-populist 
protest politics remains a force to be reckoned 
with in North American politics.  It is interesting, 
however, that most analyses of this phenomenon 
often employ a series of rationalist presumptions 
to explain the existence and causes of these move-
ments.  Proponents of the movement attempt to 
explain it as rooted in deeply held logical prin-
ciples and values — e.g., liberty, free enterprise, 
self-reliance and suspicion of government.  In 
contrast, critics (even those as sophisticated as 
Thomas Frank) assume that the grassroots of this 
movement have been hoodwinked, fooled into 
privileging concerns about social issues such as 
abortion or same-sex marriage over what should 
be their defining economic self-interest.  Both, 
however, assume that politics is best understood 
as ‘rational’ (for even critiquing a movement as 
‘irrational’ presumes that there is a clear defini-
tion of political rationality that should be op-
erative and that the cause of mass irrationality is 
clear, intentional manipulation).
If we employ the concept of a political pla-
cebo effect, however, other interpretations 
emerge.  Consider, for example, last year’s na-
tional debate engendered by one of the doyennes 
of the American conservative neo-populist move-
ment, Ann Coulter, when she visited Canada 
for a speaking tour.  Scheduled to speak at the 
University of Ottawa, her organizers cancelled the 
talk at the last minute, citing ‘security concerns’ 
and claiming that the presence of more than a 
thousand protesters had meant that the police 
could not guarantee her personal safety.
While these claims turned out to be false, it 
was the top story that night on each of the three 
main television networks and in the week that 
followed the cancellation, no less than 50 articles, 
op eds and editorials condemning the events ap-
peared in the largest 12 newspapers and media 
organizations in Canada.  Articles dealing with 
the event were also often the most ‘commented 
upon’ and ‘shared’ articles of the online sites of 
those media outlets that week, indicating that the 
attention was not simply restricted to news edi-
tors, but was shared widely by the reading public. 
Several things about this reaction were highly 
unusual.  The breadth and duration of the media 
interest in this issue was notable as it embodied 
a level of attention that very few issues outside 
of highly controversial parliamentary bills or 
events usually inspire.  It was also noteworthy 
that in their haste to express outrage, few media 
outlets bothered to question the ‘facts’ of the case 
as outlined by the Coulter camp.  Moreover, the 
emotional intensity of the condemnations was 
remarkable.  As with the interpretations of the 
U.S. Tea Party movement, Canadian supporters 
of Coulter tried to explain the outrage as a matter 
of justified, rational principle.  Detractors, on the 
other hand, dismissed the anger as an inexplica-
bly irrational reaction of people tricked by profes-
sional pot-stirrers looking for free publicity.  Both 
interpretations are probably partially true.  
But are they the whole story? No.  Instead, 
both of the dominant explanations leave us with 
more questions.  Pure free speech, of course, is 
far from a universal and unconstrained right in 
North America.  And yet one doesn’t see nation-
wide editorials condemning libel laws, for exam-
ple, which also censor speech.  Clearly, this was 
not a political debate inspired purely by a ratio-
nal issue of principle.  And the idea that this was 
simply an emotional reaction of people tricked by 
manipulative puppet-masters? Well, although it 
seems very clear that the persons involved con-
sciously staged the event to garner publicity, this 
still fails to explain why people across the coun-
try became riled up about such a minor event.  In 
other words, we’re left with a puzzle.  If it wasn’t 
consistent principle, and it is not obvious why 
people could so easily be whipped up into an 
emotional frenzy over this, what explains the in-
tense reaction? 
Here, returning to the coverage with an eye 
to the concept of a political placebo effect is help-
ful.  Recall that one of the key characteristics of 
the political placebo effect is the idea that there is 
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a closer and more complex relationship between 
physiological and mental (especially emotional) 
processes than political scientists often assume. 
If one reads closely the media coverage, what is 
perhaps most surprising is the fact that almost all 
of it framed the issue in the same way.  On one 
level, almost all discussed the issue with reference 
to the principle of free speech.  However, the most 
intense anger expressed in the coverage focused 
on the idea that this was a selective cancellation 
by the administration of the university that was 
part of a larger bias against, and exclusion of, ‘con-
servative’ ideas endemic to universities in general. 
Why would this charge of bias and exclusion 
engender such an emotional reaction, even from 
media outlets that wouldn’t be easily categorized 
as ‘conservative’? One intriguing possibility comes 
from Geoff MacDonald’s work (MacDonald, 
2005, 2010; Nordgren et al., 2011).  A psychologist 
at the University of Toronto, MacDonald suggests 
that a sense of social exclusion often generates in-
tense feelings of distress.  MacDonald and others 
hypothesize that this phenomenon has its roots in 
our evolutionary and development context — one 
in which social exclusion actually had a severe and 
negative impact on the chances of individual sur-
vival.  Making this theory even more convincing 
is the fact that over the last decade, technological 
innovations have allowed neuroscience to discov-
er that humans interpret and experience social 
exclusion at least partially using some of the same 
neural pathways that we use to experience physi-
cal pain.  A sense of social exclusion — something 
that most political scientists would consider a 
purely conceptual and mental state — engenders 
deep feelings of distress because we actually feel 
it as pain in some sense.  It is neither ‘rational’ in 
the narrow sense that political scientists usually 
understand it (i.e. having to do with some sort of 
key good or value/principle), nor is it ‘irrational’ 
in the narrow sense (i.e. being inexplicable or 
counter-productive). 
If this helps to explain why the Coulter event 
‘touched a nerve’, as it were, it might also help 
us understand why this distress was so strongly 
translated into self-righteous outrage.  As Brian 
Massumi (1995) and others have argued, even 
emotions that are socially coded as negative (e.g., 
anger, sadness, etc.) can actually be experienced as 
pleasant by many people, especially if they are in-
tense.  In particular, outrage (alongside ‘schaden-
freude’), is often identified as one of those intense, 
‘negative’ emotions which nonetheless frequently 
makes those who experience it feel ‘good’.  If this 
is true, it helps explain why the distress of social 
exclusion generated outraged responses.  Perhaps 
outrage acts like a placebo by overwhelming 
and thus soothing the distress and pain of social 
exclusion.  Even if it doesn’t address the root cause 
or ‘change anything’ from the perspective of most 
traditional political science theories, it clearly has 
an impact on the emotional distress felt by those 
moved by the event.
If the first characteristic of a political placebo 
thus helps us uncover a more complex explana-
tion for the furore over the Coulter visit and can-
cellation, the second characteristic — the meaning 
effect — is similarly crucial.  How is it that people 
across the country were so moved by this? Here, 
the idea that we always already act and feel within 
a web of social meaning — complete with arche-
typal plots, characters, moral lessons and social-
ized emotional reactions — is crucial.  The story 
that the media told about the Coulter cancella-
tion relied on and reflected a narrative, deeply 
embedded in contemporary political marketing, 
reporting and debate, that characterizes academ-
ics (among others) as snobby, leftist elites who are 
willing to use any means to silence opinions that 
run counter to their own.  Without this widely 
shared and prior narrative, the specific events 
of that night could never have created such in-
tense and widely shared distress and outrage. 
The meaning effect, in other words, is crucial for 
understanding why a minor scheduling change, 
made by the organizers themselves, and result-
ing from the poor logistical planning of the or-
ganizers, became a political firestorm across the 
country.
Finally, this case illustrates the ways in which 
the ethical dimensions of the political placebo ef-
fect differ substantially from the medical context. 
The use of outrage to salve a sense of social ex-
clusion, while doing little to address the key issue 
of social exclusion itself, is significant because it 
feeds a larger sense of social and political alien-
ation, cynicism and scepticism and hyper-parti-
san polarization, all of which are not healthy for 
our democratic system.  In this sense, the con-
cept of a political placebo effect not only helps us 
to understand why this seemingly odd political 
event became such an issue.  It also helps us to 
understand why the ethical and political ramifi-
cations of the use of the political placebo effect 
are worthy of serious examination.
Harm Reduction or Immoral  
Promotion?
A second example relates to the intensely debated 
Insite program, a Vancouver-based facility that 
allows injection drug users to consume drugs in a 
safe and supportive environment where they can 
also access a range of health care services.  The 
facility has been a lightning rod for criticism ever 
since it opened its doors in 2003.  It has been oper-
ating under an exception to Canada’s Controlled 
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Drugs and Substances Act for about eight years 
as the issue is, to quote one vocal critic, “punted 
around by the government of the day” (Montaner, 
2011).
Proponents of a harm reduction approach 
argue that safe injection sites are vital “pillars” 
of a comprehensive public health programme to 
reduce the spread of HIV, Hepatitis and other in-
fections.  In addition, sites such as these help to 
reduce the number of deaths related to overdose. 
Researchers have produced numerous studies 
to demonstrate that investments in Insite make 
sound public health sense, and save taxpayers mil-
lions of dollars in health care costs, even if there 
is some disagreement about the actual estimates 
of those savings (see Bayoumi and Zaric, 2008).  
Over the last several years, however, the 
Conservative Party of Canada — as both a mi-
nority and majority government — has strongly 
opposed it.  The former federal Health Minister, 
Tony Clement, once called Insite an “abomina-
tion” (Geddes, 2010).  A media investigation re-
vealed, in fact, that the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police had even commissioned a series of studies 
that were intended to attack the scientific merits 
of the numerous studies pointing to the positive 
public health effects of the safe injection site. 
Despite this, the RCMP had to acknowledge that 
the research conducted by the British Columbia 
Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS was scientifi-
cally sound (Geddes, 2010) — a finding that appar-
ently motivated Ottawa and the RCMP headquar-
ters to cancel a joint press conference between the 
BC Centre and the RCMP only a few days before 
the scheduled event.  The case is now before the 
Supreme Court of Canada following a federal 
government appeal of a decision in the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal that upheld the prov-
ince’s right to fund and operate the facility.  
We believe that this controversy too might be 
productively understood as a political placebo ef-
fect for a variety of reasons.  Here, however, we 
will only mention two ways.  First, it helps us see 
that the political reaction to this public health is-
sue is one that is deeply enmeshed in emotional, 
physiological responses and that the meaning 
structure of already existing narratives and plots 
has significant effects on voters’ perceptions of 
the issue.  Particularly important here is the way 
in which the users of this service, so called ‘hard 
core’ drug users, are perceived.  As Des Jarlais 
and his colleagues note (2008), drawing on psy-
chological studies conducted by Harris and Fiske, 
deep emotional responses to particular groups 
help to explain the lack of support for policies 
that seek to reduce the harms associated with 
drug use.  Harris and Fiske used neuroimaging to 
test the responses of participants to a series of im-
ages of social groups, including homeless people, 
drug addicts and the elderly.  They found neu-
ral evidence to suggest that some social groups 
are largely dehumanized in the minds of many, 
“at least as indicated by the absence of the typi-
cal neural signature for social cognition, as well 
as the exaggerated amygdala and insula reactions 
(consistent with disgust)…” (Harris and Fiske, 
2006: 852).  The ability to view drug users as less 
than human allows us to imagine that they make 
conscious choices to engage in self-destructive 
behaviours, and thus permits policy makers to 
treat them as unworthy of public sympathy or 
support.
Secondly, it helps us remember that the 
meaning–emotion structure of the representa-
tions — in this case moral frames — is crucial to 
engendering this effect.  As has been shown by 
a variety of political theorists, most political and 
religious moral discourses have deep links in, and 
tend to evoke, disgust-based emotions (Connolly, 
1999, 2002; Miller, 1997; Nussbaum, 2004).  And 
as Des Jarlais and his colleagues suggest (2008: 
1106), “within a disgust/dehumanization frame-
work, effectiveness and cost-effectiveness are 
usually not important aspects of a program or 
policy.  Rather, it is the congruency between the 
symbolic value of the program and the emotions 
of disgust, dehumanization and stigmatization 
that is critical”.  This, then, helps explain not only 
why political opponents of Insite frame the issue 
as one of moral values rather than cost-benefit 
analysis, but also why that framing resonates with 
many voters who would likely otherwise never be 
so personally moved by this policy issue.
Conclusion
We have tried to think through how ‘exportable’ 
and useful a concept such as the placebo effect 
is outside of the clinical realm.  We have argued 
that drawing on recent medical, scientific and 
social scientific language, it is possible to recon-
ceptualize the political placebo effect in creative 
ways.  Moreover, we have sought to demonstrate 
that such a concept allows us to interpret and 
understand diverse, concrete political events in 
ways that depart from the explanations offered 
by many dominant theories in political science. 
As such, although only preliminary, we hope that 
our sketch has rendered plausible our contention 
that the concept of a political placebo effect is 
something worthy of further development.
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